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Forthcoming in Social Philosophy & Policy, 35:1, Spring 2018
Abstract: Some norms are bad. Norms of revenge, female genital mutilation, honor
killings, and other norms strike us as destructive, cruel, and wasteful. The puzzle is why
so many people see these norms as authoritative and why these norms often resist change.
To answer these questions, we need to look at what “bad” norms are and how we can
evaluate them. Here I develop and integrative analysis of norms that aims to avoid
parochialism in norm evaluation. After looking and rejecting several evaluative
standards, I propose what I call a comparative-functional analysis of norms that is both
operationalizable/testable and non-parochial that can sort better and worse norms. One
conclusion of this approach is that norms are not so much “bad” and “good” as “better”
and “worse.” This approach should be of interest to theorists and practitioners alike.
Keywords: Bad Norms, Social Norms, Harm, Social Science Methodology

The ability to understand and follow social norms is arguably the most powerful ability humans
possess. It is an ability that allows us to live robustly social lives and benefit from huge networks
of cooperation. The norms we live by are diverse and numerous, varying over time and space.
Despite this, we tend to be convinced, at any given time and place, that our norms are the
norms—the only proper norms. This feature of norm identification—norm parochialism—is a
common and probably necessary part of our psychology that allows us to easily identify,
internalize, and police norm related behavior. Norm parochialism is often combined with a
tendency to moralize norms, that is, to see them as non-conventional and serious.
1
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Most of the time this combination of parochialism and moralization is innocent enough. We may
think that only barbarians use their knife and fork in a particular way or that the clothes they
wear are scandalous or outrageous. We may also believe that many of our social norms for
treating one another, for instance, taboo terms or norms of deference, are backed up by our
general egalitarian or cosmopolitan worldview. “Surely any right-thinking person would not use
that word” since it is offensive and hurtful. We may recognize that our social morality is
WEIRD, without thinking that there is anything wrong with the kind of parochialism involved in
western, liberal aversion to racism or sexism.1
Parochialism and moralization combine into a more potent stew in the case of so-called “bad
norms.” These are norms that require and regulate practices that seem destructive or odious. It is
surprisingly hard to clearly define how to identify a bad norm, as I will argue below, but some
paradigm cases range from the merely inefficient (e.g., giving gifts at Christmas time), to the
mildly dangerous (e.g., doctors wearing ties), to the horrific (female genital mutilation or socalled “honor” killings).2 All of these cases involve some inefficient or destructive practice that
is, nevertheless, a stable norm.
These kinds of norms are extremely important to understand, both practically and theoretically.
Bad norms call out for change, but this is difficult when those inside the norm culture are
committed to those norms. We may think that they are in the grips of a set of parochial and
moralized norms, but we are also surely in a similar situation. How can we evaluate and advocate
for change of bad norms without ourselves being parochial? Answering these questions leads
into other questions about the general evaluation of norms.

1

For a discussion of WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, Democratic) morality, i.e., the social
morality shared by the educated classes of western democratic society, see: Jonathan Haidt, The Righteous Mind:
Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion (Vintage, 2013), chap. 5.
2

On the inefficiency of Christmas gift giving, see: Joel Waldfogel, “The Deadweight Loss of Christmas,” The
American Economic Review 83, no. 5 (1993): 1328–36; Pedro-Jose Lopez et al., “Bacterial Counts from Hospital
Doctors’ Ties Are Higher than Those from Shirts,” American Journal of Infection Control 37, no. 1 (2009): 79–80;
John Thrasher and Toby Handfield, “Honor and Violence: An Account of Feuds, Dueling, and Honor Killing,”
Human Nature, Forthcoming 2019.
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The variety of norms and social practices around us is considerable, but not infinite. Some norms
seem to be more stable and to spread easier than others. The ultimate end of this project is to
develop some way of evaluating this panoply of norms. The challenge is that all of us are already
within an existing network of norms. Our norms seem natural to us and other norms seem alien.
The important question is whether there is any stable point of view or evaluative standard from
which we can judge all social norms. In the same way as we might, for instance, be interested in
developing a political conception of human rights that can be universally applied without being
merely parochial or a conception of justice that is stable in the face of considerable diversity.
This project is more difficult than one might initially think. Nevertheless, it is crucial since it is
essential to the project of evaluating and, hopefully, changing norms in a more tolerant and
humane way. The first step is to be clear about what social norms are and how they work. Then I
will look at several promising approaches to evaluating norms, rejecting all of them as flawed in
important ways. This leads to questions about how to analyze norms, which will ultimately lead
to a method of evaluating norms that can avoid parochialism and point in the direction of
effective norm change.

1. Norms—The Good and The Bad
There are several different accounts of norms available in the philosophical, economic, and
sociological literature. The most influential across these disciplines is the account of norms
developed by Cristina Bicchieri and her collaborators.3 Put simply, there is a social norm for
some population if enough people in that population have a conditional preference for following
the norm when they expect general conformity with that norm, both empirically and
normatively.4 Under these conditions, norm following is a Nash equilibrium since no one does

3

See: Cristina Bicchieri, Norms in the Wild (Cambridge University Press, 2016); Cristina Bicchieri, The Grammar
of Society: The Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms (Cambridge University Press, 2006).
4

For a similar explanation of institutions more generally, see: Kennneth Shepsle, “Rational Choice
Institutionalism,” in The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions, ed. R. A. W. Rhodes, Sarah A. Binder, and Bert
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better by unilaterally deviating from the norm. Either because they would lose from
miscoordination or because they would be liable to sanction from others in the group for not
complying. The key element is that my preference to conform to the norm is conditional on the
belief that others have the same preferences and that others are expecting me to conform. Both of
these need to be present in the case of social norms. If others expect me to conform to a norm,
but my preference to conform is not dependent on whether others conform to that norm, the
norm in question is what Bicchieri calls a “moral” norm. Together with “personal” norms, we
can think of non-social norms in this sense as not be conditional on the normative and empirical
expectations of others.
There are several implications to this account of norms. The most important here is that there is a
natural distinction between what we might think of as the positive social norms of a population
and the possible norms of that population. The positive norms are those that actually exist in that
population, while the possible norms are those that might exist given some change of conditional
preferences or expectations. In this way, we can separate the existence of a norm from its
evaluation. We can recognize that a norm requiring racial discrimination exists without thereby
endorsing that norm as good. The important point is that it is possible to have genuine norms that
are also, in some sense, bad. That is, we can evaluate a norm without thinking that the norm is
necessarily defective qua norm.
This accords with at least some of our common responses to certain norms. We find culinary
norms in some other societies disgusting or bad. Specifically, when other societies have norms
about what kinds of animals are considered food. In the west, we keep dogs as pets and treat
them like furry children. In Korea, China, and many other countries, dog meat is commonly
eaten. Contrast this with Australia, where it is illegal in at least one state to eat dog meat and
illegal in all other states and territories to sell it. During the Beijing Olympics, the government of
the PRC had dog removed from 112 “official” Olympic restaurants and they were ordered not to

A. Rockman (Oxford University Press, 2006), 23–38; Andrew Schotter, The Economic Theory of Social Institutions
(Cambridge University Press, 2008).
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serve dog meat during that time.5 The Chinese elites surmised that visitors would be repelled by
the Chinese dog meat norms and this would reflect poorly on the country as a whole.
There are many other examples of seemingly bad norms. But, if we want to give a precise
definition of what constitutes a bad norm, we need to go beyond discrete examples and develop a
standard that we can use to evaluate norms more generally. This project is really composed of
two subsidiary projects, one conceptual and the other evaluative. Conceptually, we need to
identify the features any account of bad norms should have to fit the common notion or concept
of a bad norm. That is, the general account of bad norms developed should intuitively fit with
most of our pre-theoretical notions of a bad norm. This idea can be understood intensionally or
extensionally. In principle, either is acceptable, but for theoretical simplicity we can think of this
idea as core extensional adequacy. The general idea of a bad norm should include the core cases
of bad norms like FGM, honor killing, cannibalism, child sacrifice, etc. In addition, the concept
of a bad norm should be operationalizable. That is, it should be constructed in such as way that
we can test whether such a norm exists and fit it into our most basic social scientific frameworks
like rational choice theory. This aspect is one of the most appealing features of the general
account of norms from Bicchieri that we began this section with and a benefit of her theory over
other competitor theories.6
The third desiderata of an account of bad norms is “non-parochialism.” This is by far, the hardest
feature to develop and it is importantly linked to the evaluation of norms. From any parochial
point of view, we can identify and evaluate any number of alien norms as bad. If, however, we
are interested in evaluating norms from a perspective that is stable across a variety of parochial
points of view, we will need to establish a more robust standard. In addition to being defective as
a conceptual standard, a parochial evaluative standard will also be practically defective. One of
the important reasons to develop an understanding of bad norms is to change them for the better.

5

“China Bans Dog from Olympic Menu,” BBC News, accessed November 4, 2016,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7501768.stm.
6

For instance, the Canberra theory of norms developed in Geoffrey Brennan et al., Explaining Norms (Oxford
University Press, 2013).
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If our evaluative standard is merely parochial moralizing, we can have little confidence that our
attempts to change bad norms will be anything more than the coercive imposition of our own
norms on others. This is a problem insofar as we are concerned about coercion, but also because
these changes will be less likely to stick. Non-parochialism does not mean that we need an
ultimate normative or evaluative standard in order to evaluate norms. This would require begging
too many important questions and would require the use of a controversial theory of morality or
value. Without settling any important questions about morality, we should think of nonparochialism as a standard that is accessible from any given parochial standpoint. In the case of
norms, the standard requires that members of the norm population could see the norm, from their
point of view as being bad. Of course, they may not see it as bad now, but they would not need to
adopt a foreign point of view in order to see the norm as bad.
As I will argue in the next two sections, to fully make sense of these features we will need to
look more at the details of how to explain and evaluate norms. Before filling in the details,
though, my claim is that an adequate account of bad norms will have three important features.
Conceptually, any account of bad norms should be able to capture the intuitive paradigm cases of
bad norms. Theoretically, a particular account should be useful in identifying actual norms
within a usable social scientific framework. The account should also be practically accessible
from a non-parochial point of view. These features are identified in the table below.

Conceptual

Theoretical

Practical

Extensional Adequacy

Operationalizable

Non-Parochial

Table 1—Features of Bad Norms

The second theoretical desideratum is solved by adopting Bicchieri’s general approach to norms.
She has shown that it is operationalizable in empirical and experimental contexts. Without
worrying too much about the meaning of the concept of bad norms, we can at least focus on the
core cases and think of the idea of bad norms as being defined extensionally to be those cases.
Non-parochialism is the hardest condition to meet, though as we saw above it is possible to
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weaken the condition slightly by making it more of an accessibility condition. If members of a
norm group can see that the norm is bad, then it is non-parochially bad.
In this section, I have tried to provide a thin but nevertheless useful account of what a bad norm
is. We still don’t have an account of what makes the norms bad, that is, how to evaluate badness,
but I have given some conditions that any account of bad norms will need to meet. To fill in
those conditions, however, we will need to look closer at how we explain and evaluate norms
more generally.

2. Evaluating Norms
In this section, I look at several possibilities for evaluating norms, before rejecting each because
of either internal problems or because it fails to meet the non-parochialism condition. In the next
section to look more closely at the explanatory structure of bad norms. This will point in the
direction of a different approach to evaluating norms that I will assess in Section 4.
2.1 Harm
The first and, perhaps, most straightforward way to evaluate bad norms is on the basis of harm.
Surely what makes norms like FGM bad is that they are harmful. This also seems to be true in
other cases like public defecation, honor killing, and norms of revenge.7 This seems to present a
plausible evaluative standard that equates bad norms with harmful norms. Bad norms are the
norms that either require or are likely to cause harm. We can state this definition of a bad norm
as:
Bad Norm as Harmful Norms: A norm R is bad if it requires or is likely to cause harm
to those in population P.

7

Bicchieri, Norms in the Wild; Thrasher and Handfield, “Honor and Violence: An Account of Feuds, Dueling, and
Honor Killing”; Christopher Boehm, Blood Revenge: The Enactment and Management of Conflict in Montenegro
and Other Tribal Societies (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1986); Jon Elster, “Norms of Revenge,”
Ethics 100, no. 4 (July 1, 1990): 862–85.
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There are several problems with this seemingly attractive formulation.
The first is that it is not clear whether the harm must be likely to only accrue to some members of
P, or to all the members of P. For instance, in cases of FGM, only the women are affected by the
norm directly and even when the norm is in place, it is rare for all of the women in the group to
be affected.8 In what sense, then, is the norm harmful to the men? Similarly, a norm of public
defecation near the riverbank seems to meet the intuitive extensional conditions to be a bad
norm, but it might be that, in a certain case, those who defecate near the river only drink water
that has come from upstream and do not end up getting sick since their water is not
contaminated. They are, however, contaminating the water downstream from them and are likely
to get anyone who is collecting water downstream sick. The harm in this case is imposed on
those outside of the population P. In these cases, it looks like the formulation of bad norms as
harmful norms is not a necessary condition of something being a bad norm.
More importantly, though, harm cannot function as an evaluative standard for bad norms because
harm itself is a norm-mediated evaluative concept—what counts as a harm will largely depend
on the norms of the particular context. To take some trivial but nevertheless illuminating
examples, consider male versus female genital mutilation. In the former case, we call it
“circumcision” and many western countries do it as a matter of course when children are born
and there is little opposition to the practice. The female version, in all of its different forms, has
substantially more negative effects and the two kinds of “circumcision” are only similar in that
they both involve cutting of the genitals. We might think that the difference is that the male
version is considered a negligible harm, while the female version is more seriously. In terms of
pain and related health complications, this distinction is warranted. The problem, however, is
that the male version, where it is the norm, is not considered a negligible harm; rather it is
typically considered harmless. Harming is different from hurting. Something that hurts may or
may not be a harm and harms may or may not hurt. Harming is a kind of wronging and it,

8

In Charles Efferson et al., “Female Genital Cutting Is Not a Social Coordination Norm,” Science 349, no. 6255
(September 25, 2015): 1446–47.
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consequently has a deontic aspect. Admittedly, this is not the only way to think of harm, but it is
a natural one in the moral context.
Another interpretation is that the male circumcision case is really a case of justified harm.
Circumcision is a harm, but that harm is justified on the basis of religious or health
considerations. Similarly, surgery is harmful, but it is often justified because of the benefits. This
example, however, precisely shows why it makes little sense to think of harms in this way. Do
we really think that the surgeon is harming the patient by cutting them up? Even if the patient
dies on the surgery table, it seems weird to claim that he or she was harmed by the surgeon
unless, and this is the crucial point, the surgeon acted improperly or negligently. Which is to say
unless the surgeon violated the relevant norms. Similarly, my suspicion is that Jews do not
believe that mohels are harming their boys by circumcising them, quite the opposite.
The role that consent plays in harm highlights the fact that harm is a normatively laden concept.
Punching or being punched by someone is generally considered harmful behavior, but if this
punching is done within a boxing match or a hockey game, it is not considered harmful (so far as
it is within the norms of that game). This is not because we expect fewer negative effects to
occur from boxing than from some other type of punching, it is not harmful since both parties
have consented to engage in the practice in certain norm-governed ways. Consent can play this
important role, because harm is a specification of the normative properties and deontic
restrictions between individuals.
Rights violations of various kinds can be harmful even if there is no loss. For instance, imagine
Tom takes Ralph’s car while Ralph is at work and runs an errand with it, returning it to Tom
before Ralph gets back from work. Tom didn’t have Ralph’s permission and Ralph and Tom are
not very good friends. In order to sweeten the situation, Tom leaves a $20 bill on Ralph’s dash. It
seems perfectly reasonable to say about this case both that Ralph was harmed by Tom and that
Ralph was made better off. If this case, isn’t compelling imagine some other, more important,
trespass that is not consented to, but also somehow compensated. Someone in a coma can be
harmed even if they never find out about it and were never made worse off, for instance.

9
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Harm relies on various other norms for its specification in particular contexts. This is partially
what makes harm such an intuitive and useful concept to use within a particular society as an
evaluative standard, but less effective when it goes beyond a given normative framework. Using
harm as the standard will not only beg the evaluative question, it will not meet the nonparochialism condition since any harm standard will have some sort of parochial norm system
associated with it. It might be possible that there is a standard of harm that is independent of any
other parochial normative point of view, but there is no evidence of one as of yet.

2.2 Efficiency
A thinner evaluative standard that does not require reference to additional norms is an efficiency
standard. In this context, efficiency is the economic concept of efficiency as Pareto efficiency.
For norms we can think of this standard in the following way:
Bad Norms as Inefficient Norms: A norm R1 is a bad norm if there is some other norm
R2 that no member of P would rank as worse than than R1 and at least one member of P
would rank as better than R1.
There is an obvious advantage to this standard over the harm standard in terms of nonparochialism since the evaluation is made from the point of view each member of P. This
advantage, however, comes at a cost for operationalizability.
There are two other big problems that make an efficiency standard difficult from an
operationalizable point of view. The first is identifying the set of feasible alternatives to make
efficiency comparisons. Bad norms on this view are basically norms that are off the Pareto
frontier, but we need to have a good idea of where that frontier actually is to make determinate
evaluations. If all that is required is to show that some alterative norm is preferable than the
current norm, this is a trivially easy task to accomplish. Any norm can be specified in such a way
as to make it a Pareto improvement over the current norm if it is off the Pareto frontier. The
problem is that there will be many, perhaps innumerable, other norms that would also be Pareto
improvements, but that might benefit certain persons more than other. In those cases, distributive
concerns will arise and we will need a standard other than the Pareto standard to solve these
10
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problems. In any case, without precisely specifying the set of feasible alternatives, it will be
impossible to define the Pareto frontier and to give a thorough evaluation of the bad norms.
One solution to this will be to make the efficiency standard comparative so that we are not
identifying bad norms, but merely identifying better and worse norms. So, if members of P
would choose norm R1 over R2 on the basis of their preferences, then R1 is better than R2
according to efficiency. This has certain theoretical benefits, but it does even worse on the
standard of operationalizability. The reason is that this standard y path dependent and does not
translate to the previous efficiency approach. The possible Pareto improvements depend entirely
on what the current norm is and what options we have. There are some options on the Pareto
frontier that it will be impossible to realize given only Pareto permissible moves. This means that
we need to know not only the options but the paths to realize them. The fact that a norm is Pareto
optimal does not tell us anything about whether there is a Pareto permissible path that we can
take to realize that option.
Efficiency as a general standard of evaluation is either non-operationalizable or incoherent as a
standard that can meet the conceptual adequacy test or the non-parochial test. The point is that
for efficiency to work, it needs to be highly specific in a well-defined and limited counterfactual
space. This is not likely in the case of norm evaluation. Efficiency considerations are also
typically path dependent in a number of ways which makes them extremely complicated in terms
of operationalizability as well as often parochial. Despite this, as I will argue in Section 4, a
modified version of the efficiency standard, when combined with other elements can form the
basis of a standard of norm evaluation.

2.3 Welfare
Once we see the problems with the normatively thin efficiency standard, we might be tempted to
move towards a more substantive welfare standard. By invoking an objective standard of
welfare, we could potentially evaluate whether the norms in question are welfare enhancing or
not and define bad norms as those that are detrimental to welfare.

11
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Bad Norms as Welfare Reducing Norms: A norm R1 is a bad norm if the net result of P
of R1 is less welfare than would result if R1 were not in place.
The way this standard is formulated it is both counterfactual and comparative. We have to
evaluate whether the member of P would be better off with or without R1 and the counterfactual
world may include some other norm or no norm. So, in effect, we are comparing R1 to some
other feasible norm R* and no norm R0 along a welfare metric. If R1 > (R* ∨ 𝑅# ) then we can say
that R1 is not a bad norm.
There are several problems with this formulation. The first is that, like the efficiency standard,
we need a discrete and reasonably small set of R* in order to be confident about whether the
norm in question is bad. It will be trivially easy to show that any norm is bad if merely any norm
can be shown to be better in some welfare terms. Second, since the evaluation is counterfactual
we need to be able to keep all the non-norm features fixed when we are doing the counterfactual
analysis. Often this is very-0 difficult to do since the norms are embedded in complex cultural
and social networks that make changing the norm and only the norm difficult or impossible. This
is a practical as well as theoretical problem that impacts the operationalizability of this approach.
A similar problem arises with Randomized Control Trials (RCT) and the Instrumental Variable
(IV) approach in development economics. As Angus Deaton has argued that both of these
approaches have a similar problem when results are applied across time and between societies.9
We should be skeptical of our ability to make very good evaluations or inferences on the basis of
this standard in an operationalizable way.
These objections all assume that the welfare metric is itself something that we have confidence
in, but there is little reason to think that we can find a good welfare metric to play that role
effectively. Philosophical theories of welfare are as numerous as there are welfare theorists and
most are too abstract and formally thin to be very helpful in the actual evaluation of real norms.
They will also tend to be parochial. Any general welfare metric will also have the problem of
9

See: Angus Deaton, “Instruments, Randomization, and Learning about Development,” Journal of Economic
Literature 48, no. 2 (2010): 424–455; Angus Deaton, The Great Escape: Health, Wealth, and the Origins of
Inequality (Princeton University Press, 2013).
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requiring some interpersonal comparisons of utility, which there is a long tradition of seeing as
illegitimate.10
Despite these problems, we might still think that there is some welfare proxy that we could use
and following development economics there seem to be several plausible candidates. For
instance, GDP or the more disaggregated purchasing power parity (PPP) measure to evaluate
how well-off different societies are to one another. There is good data on these measures and
recent work has led to significantly improved versions of these measures.11 The problem with
using these measures with norm evaluation is that they are too coarse-grained to usually allow
for comparative norm evaluation. There are many factors that contribute to GDP and PPP in
complex ways, so many that development economists have no clear theory about how they
interact with culture, history, institutions, geography, and norms. We might be able to use these
measures as crude proxies for societies that are generally not well off, but we won’t be able to
know if they aren’t well off because or despite a certain norm. Another possibility is to use
subjective measures of well-being or happiness, but this has many of the same problems of being
too course-grained and information intensive, while also replicating some of the problems from
efficiency standards.
These problems should lead us to look for another solution, an approach that can be both
operationalizable and non-parochial as well as capture the intuitive difference between good and
bad norms. To understand what is needed, however, we need to look at how we explain bad
norm following. Doing so will lead to a method of analysis that we can use to develop an
evaluative standard that avoids some of the problems discussed here.

10

Lionel Robbins, “Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility: A Comment,” The Economic Journal 48, no. 192
(December 1938): 635; Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values, Revised Edition (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1963).
11

Angus Deaton, “Income, Health, and Well-Being around the World: Evidence from the Gallup World Poll,” The
Journal of Economic Perspectives 22, no. 2 (April 1, 2008): 53–72; Angus Deaton and Olivier Dupriez, “Purchasing
Power Parity Exchange Rates for the Global Poor,” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 3, no. 2 (April
1, 2011): 137–66.
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3. Explaining Bad Norms
If we have identified some norm that we think fits the bill as a bad norm we also need to explain
how the members of the norm group could both see it as a norm and potentially as a bad norm.
That is, if the members of the group already mostly don’t agree with the norm or follow it, it
won’t meet the basic existence conditions of a norm. Instead, we need to show that even though
the norm may be bad, they have some reason to follow it as a norm. For instance, in some
cultures norms of revenge and feuds are common.12 These are core cases of bad norms in the
conceptual sense from above. At least a critical mass of people within these societies, however,
see these norms as norms, that is, as creating legitimate normative and empirical expectations.
We need a method of analysis that recognizes this datum and incorporates it into the analytical
and explanatory framework.
One might think that this approach is merely a descriptive or positive analysis of norms which
ignores the properly normative aspects of evaluation. If this were true, it would be fatal to the
project presented here since the ultimate goal is to evaluate norms, not merely to describe them.
Of course, many would dispute a strong fact/value or descriptive/normative divide, but is not my
goal to make any important claims on that issue here. Still, it is worth noting that this distinction
is especially flexible in the case of norms. Norms are, nor surprisingly, the basic material of
normativity and when we are analyzing norms our task is both descriptive/positive and
normative. The important point for the investigation here is that when we are dealing with
genuine norms, the members of the norm group, at least, take these see themselves as having
reason to follow these norms. Insofar as the theorist is concerned with practice and
operationalizability—as I am—this cannot be ignored and the normativity of the norms for the
norm population must be taken as a given. We can do this by adopting something like a Quinean
or Davidsonian principle of charity when interpreting bad norms. That is, we should interpret the
norm so as to construe the followers of that norm as rational. The assumption here is that all
normal human agents are rational in the minimal sense of behaving in coherent, non-random

12

Boehm, Blood Revenge.
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ways. Our job is to rationally reconstruct what could be the coherent reasons why these
individuals are following this particular norm and what, in turn, the norm is.
Although this is a basic assumption of most social science, this principle has some interesting
properties in this context. It means that all good explanations or analysis of norms will have a
complex structure. Since it is always possible to show that someone had a reason to do
something, in this case endorse or follow a norm, on the basis of some set of beliefs about the
world, we need a non-trivial way of fixing and evaluating those beliefs. To do that effectively,
we need to evaluate norms on three different, though related levels. The first is the proximate
level of why an individual has reason to endorse or follow a norm. These explanations will be
psychological or have rational choice explanations. The types of explanations in most of the
economics literature has this form. We can still ask, however, why this norm and not another and
why individuals will have evolved or developed preferences to follow these norms. To answer
these questions, we will need to move to the level of evaluating the norm itself and specifically
its stability properties. These ultimate explanations will look at how this particular norm could
have evolved and stabilized. Once we have these two parts of the explanation, we also need to
understand the details of how the norm in question works in a particular historical or cultural

Method of Explanation

context. To do this we will need to look at ethnographic and historical data. This will help us
know if the previous two levels of our analysis are well-founded. These levels are described in
the figure below.

Ultimate rational explanation
(evolutionary/strategic)

Norm

Thin / formal / general

Proximate rational explanation
(psychological/rational choice)

Historical and Cultural Context

Thick / specific

(History/Sociology/Anthropology)

Table 2—Integrative Norm Analysis
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So, following Mackie, the ultimate explanation of FGM in Africa is that FGM is a norm
equilibrium that creates confidence in paternity and prevents women from being unchaste.13 A
sociobiological story can be told along these lines and Mackie and others have shown how this
could be a stable equilibrium using plausible assumptions. Using historical and ethnographic, we
can test this hypothesis against the history of the peoples who practice FGM. We can then
hypothesize about the proximate rational explanation in terms of the beliefs and preferences the
men and women in the norm group must have in order to maintain the practice. This can be
further checked with interviews and surveys.
At the proximate level there are several types of explanations for why particular individuals
follow a particular norm. The most deflationary answer is that they prefer to follow the norm
than to do otherwise. This explanation is a trivial one in one sense, but non-trivial in another.
There is the question of whether individuals follow norms because they are norms, that is, do
they have a preference to follow a norm or is the norm an emergent property of their preferences
taken as a whole. The second is the case of classic Lewis style conventions or pure coordination
problems.14 In a Lewis convention, a practice is a convention not because every individual
recognizes that they should follow the convention, but merely because knowing the practice
allows them to coordinate effectively given that everyone else does the same. Insofar as there is a
normative element in conventions, it is a tremendously weak form of rational normativity. The
interesting thing, though, is that it is very difficult to find uncontroversial cases of conventions of
this form. The most used example, perhaps, is driving on the left or the right, but I suspect most
of us would imbue this with a stronger normative force than the conventional explanation should
allow. If we were to see someone driving on the wrong side of the road we wouldn’t tend to
think “look at that fool, he would coordinate better if he were only on the other side” but rather,
“look at that dangerous lunatic who is one the wrong side of the road, putting us all at risk!” As
someone who has recently transitioned from driving on the right to driving on the left, I can
testify that the transition was not only difficult, it actually felt wrong. It seems to be very easy to

13

Gerry Mackie, “Ending Footbinding and Infibulation: A Convention Account,” American Sociological Review 61,
no. 6 (1996): 999–1017.
14
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load our conventional expectations with normative heft generating genuine social norms. Paul
Rozin’s description of the process of moralization may shed some light on this phenomenon.15
We may also want to look to Haidt’s social intuitionist model of moral judgment.16 According to
Haidt, our judgments are pre-loaded and are heavily affect laden. When we give reasons for our
judgments we do so to convince others, not to justify those conclusions to ourselves. Since
normative expectations and evaluations are some of the most powerful weapons in our
persuasive and justificatory arsenal, it is perhaps no surprise that we are quick to deploy them.
What is more surprising is that we should be so susceptible to their charms.
Sometimes this normative projection can cause problems, however. One example is in the case
of pluralistic ignorance. This kind of situation creates what Bicchieri calls a “collective illusion”
about a norm and, as she notes, norms based on collective illusions can be “fragile.”17 Once the
illusion is undermined, there can be a cascade away from the norm. One strong hypothesis about
why people follow norms that seem obviously “bad” like FGM is that there is widespread
pluralistic ignorance. As Mackie is careful to point out, almost all of the people who practice
FGM claim to love and want what is best for their daughters.18 They believe everyone else in
their group wants the same. The problem is that they have false beliefs about how much other
people are committed to the norm. In reality, so this explanation goes, most people are opposed
to the norm and only follow it because they wrongly believe that others are committed to it.
Although there is some reason to think that this original explanation was too simple, Bicchieri
takes this idea further and introduces a variable K that acts as a weight on how much the norm in
question factors into an individual’s utility function.19
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Psychological Review 108, no. 4 (October 2001): 814–34; Haidt, The Righteous Mind.
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The pluralistic ignorance explanation is charitable since it assumes that individuals in a norm
group are rational and it seeks to formally characterize their utility functions. It does, however,
assume that those individuals are under an illusion and that the norm will evaporate once this
illusion is punctured. Another explanation is that, given the alternative available, the norm in
question is the best available or, at least, that there is no better norm available. If this is a
possibility in a large number of bad norms cases, as I will argue that it is, then pluralistic
ignorance is a special not general proximate explanation. The implication will be troubling since
changing bad norms will be more difficult than undermining an existing illusion. This will lead
us away from proximate analysis on its own and towards linking proximate and ultimate analysis
with an evaluative standard. I turn to that in the next section.

4. Comparative-Functional Analysis
The main problem with the welfare approaches that they attempted to present a global standard
to evaluate norms. As we saw, these approaches had several serious problems, as do all other
methods of attempting to provide some global evaluative standard for norms. In addition, we saw
in the last section that understanding norms requires different kinds of analysis at several
different levels. Most analysis is concerned only with the proximate or the historical/cultural. In
this section, I will argue that we need to incorporate more of the ultimate analysis on order to
evaluate norms and show how this can be done in the case of honor norms.
To move beyond the evaluative standards, we saw in section 3, we need to expand the
information base we use to evaluate norms. The efficiency and welfare approach only look at
outcomes and ignores the process by which norms generate these outcomes. This may seem
harmless since we are ultimately concerned about the welfare effects of these norms, but it
makes our evaluation of these norms more difficult as well. In this section, I will argue that we
need to look at the functional role that norms play in particular contexts to be able to coherently
evaluate them. Once we see what roles these norms play, we can attempt to evaluate whether
there are alternative norms that can also play that role as well or better than the norm in question.
If so, we can then evaluate what the benefits and costs of shifting to a new norm will be along
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various dimensions. In some cases, the new norm will dominate the old norm on all the relevant
dimensions and in those cases, the alternative norm will be preferable to everyone. This will not
be the typical case, but whatever the different costs and benefits, this form of evaluation will
make it clear to those participating in the norm how expensive the norm is in terms of the
opportunity cost of switching to a new norm.
Put simply, this comparative-functional approach to evaluating norms solves some of the
problems that we have seen with other ways of evaluating norms. First, it avoids the Pareto
problem by not attempting to make a global evaluation and thereby avoiding the problem of
fixing the context of comparison. The Pareto standard requires a fixed standard for evaluation in
order to determine whether something is a Pareto improvement or not. This parameter is free in
the global standard, making Pareto evaluations of norms either trivial or impossible. On the local
functional approach, however, we can fix the Pareto baseline at the status quo and evaluate the
norm in question with respect to a fixed neighborhood of other possible norms. So, rather than
evaluating a given norm against all other possible norms, we evaluate a specific norm against a
set of feasible alternatives. What will determine the feasible alternatives will not always be clear
and it will be necessary to look at the functional role of the norm in question to help populate
that set.
We should not confuse the idea of a “functional role” with traditional “functionalist” social
theory. Functionalism as a general approach to social theory has rightly been discredited.20
Instead, the “functional” aspect comparative-functional analysis should be understood as a kind
of as-if analysis that mirrors, at the ultimate level of analysis, the assumption of charity at the
proximate level of analysis.21 That is, we assume that if a norm exists, it represents a stable
equilibrium of social interaction. This alone, however, tells us very little. We need to know more
about the kind of interaction for which this norm represents an equilibrium to understand the

20
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norm. As Bicchieri argues, norms often represent equilibria that are only possible once the norm
has been implemented and, thereby, changed the initial base game. To identify the social
“functional role” of a norm then is to identify what game this norm acts as an equilibrium for.
Only once we know that can we effectively compare the norm in question to other norms that
might also be equilibria to that game or to think of ways of changing the game with additional or
different norms.22 Obviously, then, comparative-functional analysis is not a rejection of
methodological individualism. Indeed, the integrative approach explained above and
comparative-functional analysis only make sense from a methodological point of view. Any
“functional role,” since it is an equilibrium in a game, must be ultimately reducible to the
proximate preferences, believes, and values of the individuals in the norm group. Still,
comparative-functional analysis goes beyond traditional rational choice theory in unifying the
ultimate level of analysis (as-if functional role) with the proximate level (the rational decision
making of individual choosers). Doing so, allows us to determine the set of feasible norm
alternatives.
Once this set is populated, we can compare a specific norm 𝑅$ against members of 𝑅∗ and ask
whether the move from 𝑅$ to each element of 𝑅 ∗ would be a Pareto improvement. The members
of 𝑅∗ that would be judged a Pareto improvement for the set 𝑀, the maximal set of 𝑅∗ where
𝑀 ⊆ 𝑅∗ and 𝑀(𝑅∗ , ≽) = [𝑥|𝑥 ∈ 𝑅 ∗ & 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑛𝑜 𝑦 ∈ 𝑅 ∗ : 𝑦 ≻ 𝑥] .23 That is the maximal set is
composed of all the elements where there is no element that strictly dominates another. Put
simply, 𝑀 defines the Pareto frontier of feasible, efficient alternatives. The alternatives in the
maximal set, by definition, do not Pareto dominate one another and so, from the point of view of
Pareto analysis this is the end of the story, but there is clearly more we can say about each
alternative. It might be that some alternatives are comparatively better for some members of the
population or that some alternatives seem like a particularly good or bad match for a given
population. Comparing those alternatives to one another and to the status quo norm, we can
generate the relative price of the alternatives in terms of the opportunity cost of moving to one
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norm rather than another. Different members of the population will view this price differently.
Some will see the status quo as very expensive while others will see particular alternatives as
expensive.
There is an additional question about whether each norm has one and only one function role or,
to put it another way, whether there is a principled way of individuating norms and functions.24
In one sense, there will always be a certain indeterminacy in the individuation of norms in the
same way that in decision theory there is the fundamental problem of individuating states and
actions. Or rather, the problem is in providing a unique individuation of norms and, for that
matter, functions. To ask whether there is only one function for each norm is really to ask two
questions then. First, can norms and functions be uniquely individuated and second, is there a
function that relates each function to each norm. I am not confident that either of these questions
can be answered in a non-trivial way that is externally valid. Both individuation and the
relationship between norms and functions proceeds from the goals of the researcher. Which is to
say that the practice of investigation will fix the answer to these questions as work continues on
these problems. By following the integrative approach, feedback between the local level of norm
participants and models will contribute to making the individuation and relationship between
norms and functions more and more externally valid over time.
Following the tradition in social choice and bargaining theory, we might see the goal at this point
as developing a mechanism with certain properties (strategy-proof, incentive compatibility, etc.)
for negotiating these prices and determining a unique solution to which norm should be chosen.
This would be a mistake in the case of norms, however. Norms do not arise from a process of
collective choice and it would be misleading to think of the process of norm evaluation and
change as similar to collective choice rather than social evolution.25
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This approach has the potential to avoid parochialism because it requires us to look at the norm
both from the ultimate point of view and the point of view of those within the norm group.
Evaluating a norm from either point of view separately would miss something important, either
the function of the norm or the reasons individuals have for following it. Evaluating feasible
alternatives and weighing their relative costs also requires us to take the point of view of those
within the norm group. All of this should act as a check on parochialism. Further, since this
approach basically adopts a Bicchieri norm analysis at the proximate level it should be
operationalizable and testable in the same ways. Conceptually, we use our already exiting
notions of bad norms to identify potential candidates to test, so it should meet that desideratum
as well. It looks like the comparative-functional account can meet all of the desiderata set out in
section 1.
Used as a method for analyzing and evaluating norms, the comparative-functional can be
understood as a high-level algorithm or as a series of questions:
1. What is the norm?
2. What social functional role does this norm play?
3. What is the historical/institutional/cultural context of the norm?
4. What are the reasons that individuals comply with and expect others to comply
with the norm?
5. Are there other feasible norms that would:
a. Perform the same or similar functional role
b. Are compatible with the context
c. Could be supported by similar reasons?
6. What are the relative costs and benefits of moving to one of these norms for those
in the norm group?
Answering all of these questions will be difficult on require attacking the problem from all three
levels of analysis described in the last section.
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To see how this works in detail, it is worth looking at a concrete example of this comparative
functional analysis in action. My colleague Toby Handfield and I have developed a comparativefunctional analysis of violent honor norms, what we call honor-based violence.26 Feuds,
vendettas, and duels undertaken to defend one’s honor or to repair some slight to honor are
classic examples. Another form of honor-based violence is the honor killings of women who
have violated or are believed to have violated community sexual norms. We argue that in
societies with weak governance institutions norms of honor-based violence can help to solve two
types recurrent problems: deterrence and assurance. We divide the honor norms dealing with
each problem into what we call revenge and purification honor norms.
Revenge honor norms serves to address one of the oldest problems of politics: how to emerge
from a Hobbesian state of nature, where “there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof
is uncertain,” to a society in which property rights are sufficiently secure that economic activity
can thrive.27 This problem—the deterrence problem—is the problem of establishing a credible
threat that violations of one’s self or property will be met with violence in virtually all
circumstances, regardless of the strength of the attacker. Or, more precisely, that one will not
evaluate threats by weighing the costs and benefits of response at a particular time. Credible
deterrence is a combination of two features. First, one must be able to signal strength. Second,
one must be able to signal that one (or the collective of which one is a part) can be counted on to
carry out retaliation, even where this is not strictly rational. Attacks or trespasses will be resisted
even when the costs of doing so will outweigh the benefits.
The second type of honor norm, which we call purification honor norms, relate to assurance. The
practice of “honor killings” and similar phenomena emerge from this category. Honor killings
occur when, typically, male members in a family kill one of their female relatives because she
has violated norms of sexual impropriety. In their eyes, she has “dishonored” the family with her
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behavior and they believe the only way that debt of honor can be paid is with her life. For
instance, in October of 2009, Faleh Hassan Almaleki killed his daughter Noor Almaleki by
running her down with his Jeep in a Phoenix, Arizona parking lot. Noor, 20 years old, had defied
her father by walking away from an arranged marriage with a cousin in Iraq and by living with
her boyfriend against her father’s wishes. She had, according to her father, become “too
westernized.”28 In that Phoenix parking lot, Faleh revved his engine and accelerated directly into
his daughter Noor, dragging her for 20 feet behind the Jeep.
Ten years earlier, in 1999, a 19-year-old Kurdish Swede named Pela Atroshi was executed at
close range by a gunshot to her head.29 The killer was one of her uncles who, with a group of his
other male relatives, plotted and carried out the murder of his niece. Two of these men, the
patriarch Abdulmajid Atroshi and one of the accomplices, were living in Australia at the time.
They lured Pela back to Kurdish lands in Northern Iraq where they assumed—correctly—that the
honour killing would be punished lightly. Three of the murderers were convicted. They were
sentenced with a one-year, suspended sentence. The court cited the “defendants’ honourable
motivation” as a reason to excuse their offense. In societies that practice honor killing, there is a
strong preoccupation with a woman’s sexual behavior. Women are frequently confined, veiled,
and deprived of opportunities to work or study. A superior equilibrium is available, in which
these costly practices are not regarded as pre-requisites for marriage; but because any family
which deviates from the conventions is likely to suffer immediate costs in the marriage market, it
is difficult to shift. Another example of norms that seem to have the same function are the norms
that govern violent gangs in American prisons.30 In prisons, there is no recourse to external
governance mechanisms to deter violence and the prisoners must organize themselves into
protective associations to provide that function.
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In the case of honor killing, the norm is that the male family members in a culture with this norm
must kill a female family member who has been (or is thought to have been) unchaste. The social
function the norm performs, we argue, is to guarantee purity and assurance between families in
heavily asymmetric and long time-frame exchanges. The historical/institutional/cultural context
of the norm vary from society to society, but there are important similarities in family structure
and unreliability of paternity. Individuals comply with the norm because they see it as reflecting
on the “honor” or value of their family and see the sister or daughter as undermining the
reliability or trustworthiness of the family.31
Are there other feasible norms in this case? That question is difficult to answer. In one sense the
answer is obviously “yes.” Marriages occur in parts of India, Pakistan, or other parts of the world
without resorting to honor killing, so we know that there is a feasible alternative because there is
an actual alternative.32 The relevant question, though, is whether the people in the norm group
would see this option as feasible. Presumably many know that this is not how women are treated
in many other parts of the world and yet still engage in this practice. We hypothesize that
stronger, civil marriage law, a more open marriage market, and reliable paternity information
could help make alternative norms seem less costly, but more work still needs to be done one this
issue, there are still a lot of unknowns about the properties of this signaling equilibrium even if
our analysis is correct.

5. Conclusion
One implication of comparative-functional analysis of norms is that we should probably be less
confident in our intuition that some norms are “bad” as such. Many norms will be better or worse
than some alternative and it is a crucial aspect of evaluating those norms to also identify those
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alternatives and to judge their feasibility. If this is right, feasibility analysis and norm evaluation
will be closely related. A “bad” norm with worse feasible alternatives or no feasible alternative
maybe bad in some sense, but as good as it gets in the current context. David Skarbek’s analysis
of prison populations helps us to understand that often what looks like irrational violence can
have an underlying order. Often any organization of violence by norms is an important
improvement over the alternative.33
To change these norms, as I argued with the honor killing case, more than beliefs and values will
need to change. Somehow the functional role that the norm currently performs will need to be
performed by another norm or be rendered unnecessary. This can be done is variety of ways, but
understanding the beliefs and preferences of the individuals in the norm group as well as the
historical/cultural context will be crucially important. Although it will be important to identify
broad classes of norms, such as honor norms, and their functions, we shouldn’t be too confident
in how much the analysis will translate from one place to another. Still, humans are pretty similar
in their essential rationality and their need and desire to improve their lives and the lives of their
families. We encounter many of the same problems in different guises and although different in
substance, it may be that the forms of many norms share similar features and have similar
functions.
One of the goals of this approach has been to avoid parochialism. Parochialism is a kind of
defect despite how common and natural it is. As people, we often forget the common humanity
that binds us together. Parochialism can also blind us to what norms are actually doing in the
societies where they exist. Developing and refining a non-parochial standard for evaluating
norms is not only theoretically important, but it may also help to avoid approaches that may
prove to be counter-productive in the “wild”. Hopefully the comparative-functional approach and
the integrative analytical framework it is embedded in will help theorists as well as practitioners
in this field.
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